- Wireless heart and drug monitoring stations within emergency wards that have open WiFi connections; where anyone with an iPhone searching for an Internet connection can make an unauthenticated connection and have their web browser bring up the admin portal of the station.
- Remote surgeon support and web camera interfaces used for emergency operations brought down by everyday botnet malware because someone happened to surf the web one day and hit the wrong site.
- Internet auditing and scanning services run internationally and encountering medical devices connected directly to the Internet through routable IP addresses – being used as drop-boxes for file sharing groups (oblivious to the fact that it’s a medical device under their control).
- Common WiFi and Bluetooth auditing tools (available for android smartphones and tablets) identifying medical devices during simple “war driving” exercises and leaving the discovered devices in a hung state.
- Medial staff’s iPads without authentication or GeoIP-locking of hospital applications that “go missing” or are borrowed by kids and have applications (and games) installed from vendor markets that conflict with the use of the authorized applications.
- NFC from smartphone’s and payment systems that can record, playback and interfere with the communications of implanted medical devices.